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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah
W. R. YOUNG,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
ERNEST H. BARDSLEY,
Impleaded Plaintiff,

NO. 7844

vs.
RAY H. BUCHANAN,
Defendant and Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
This is an appeal by the defendant from an adverse
judgment for $500 commission, $200 attorney's fee and
costs, in an action brought by and on behalf of a licensed
real estate salesman on a written contract of employment.
The licensed and bonded real estate broker by or for
whom the salesman was employed, or under whose authority the salesman worked, was impleaded as a party plaintiff to the action and the judgment runs in his favor for
the use and benefit of the salesman, who, under the facts
in the case, by reason of the terms of his employment by
the broker, is the real party in interest.
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The controlling facts in the case are not in conflict and
are set out in appellant's brief. We have no quarrel with
the appellant's statement of the facts.
ARGUMENT
I.
THIS IS A CLEAR CASE WHERE THE SALESMAN
HONESTLY EARNED THE PROMISED COMMISSION;
THE ONLY QUESTION TO BE DECIDED IS WHETH^
ER UNDER THE LAW HE IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER
IN THIS ACTION.
That the salesman honestly earned the promised commission is demonstrated by the facts.
Buchanan hired Young to find a buyer for the Buchanan home, the price to be $17,500, later reduced to
$16,500, and promised in writing to pay a commission of
$500 if the salesman were successful in his efforts.
The contract (Ex. A) of hiring, being in writing, was
in compliance with the Statute of Frauds, Sec. 33-5-4 (5),
U. C. A. 1943.
The contract gives the salesman an exclusive agency
to sell for a period of six months from the date of its execution, which was June 12, 1949, and then goes on to stipulate that if Buchanan should sell the property within a period of three months from the date of its expiration to any
person to whom Young had previously offered it, then Buchanan would pay the stated commission.
Immediately after the contract was signed Young got
busy interesting buyers. He offered the property to several prospects, among the very first being Cecil King. King
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was interested but said the price was too high (T. 13, 14,
15, 19).
Young promptly informed Buchanan of King's interest
and of his statement regarding the price.
Young continued to work on the sale of the property
until the contract expired on December 12, 1949. And
then, in January, 1950, which was after the contract had
expired as as exclusive listing, Buchanan told Young to continue his efforts to find a buyer at $17,500; so Young did
take other prospects down to look at the place, among them
one Wegener, who was very much interested. About March
1 to 4, Buchanan told Young to tell Wegener that the price
was reduced to $16,500 (T. 21).
Young thereupon communicated to King the information that the price had been reduced to $16,500, and King
said he would look at it (T. 22).
Then Young took Wegener down to look at the property, and King and his wife were there talking with the
Buchanans (T. 27).
It is not unreasonable to suggest that King made up
his mind to buy when he saw that someone else was interested; for Buchanan sold the home to King, the parties
dealing directly with each other and by-passing the salesman, for a cash price of $16,500, on the 17th day of February, 1950, which is the date on the check given at the
time of the sale.
It is therefore apparent that Young brought this seller and buyer together, that it was through his efforts that
Buchanan was able to sell his home at a price which was
satisfactory to him.
Young fully performed the services for which he was
employed; Buchanan has reaped the benefits of Young's
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services and has enjoyed the fruits of his contract. The
sale was made within the stipulated time.
In equity and good conscience, therefore, Young is entitled to his pay.
The judgment in the case does equity and justice between the parties, and for that reason it should be affirmed,
unless there be some impelling reason to be found in the
statutes relating to real estate brokers and real estate salesmen why it cannot be permitted to stand (Ch. 2, Title 82,
U. C. A., 1943).

n.
THERE IS NO LEGAL REASON WHY THIS JUDGMENT CANNOT STAND.
Bardsley was a licensed and bonded real estate broker
and Young was a licensed real estate salesman under the
laws of the State of Utah during 1949. They had an agreement among themselves to the effect that Young was to
pay all expenses of the broker business and was to be entitled to all the commissions on sales which he made. Bardsley himself did not wish to engage in the broker business
that year, but he did want to keep his license in effect. It
was necessary because of the provisions of the statutes that
Young work for or under the direction of some licensed and
bonded broker. There does not seem to be any reason
whatever why they might not in these circumstances make
the arrangement which they did make for payment of the
expenses of the business and for the disposition of the commissions. Bardsley had a right to give Young all the commissions just as much as he had the right to pay Young a
salary or a part of the commissions. What they did in this
respect concerned no one but themselves. So far as the
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public is concerned, and so far as the rights of any customer are concerned, these arrangements are wholly immaterial; for the public and the customers are protected by
Bardsley's bond, regardless of how the broker and the salesman agreed to dispose of the earned commissions.
The agreement between Bardsley and Young is a material fact, however, upon one question in the case. That
question relates to the proper or necessary party or parties
plaintiff.
Since the agreement provides that Young is to have
all the commissions, it would seem that Young is the real
party in interest and is the proper party to bring the action. At the time the action was commenced Section 822-18, which prohibits actions by licensed salesmen to collect
commissions, was not on the books. It came into the picture in 1951. So there was no statute which in express language prohibited the salesman from maintaining the action.
But that statute was in effect when the case came on for
trial. When the action was commenced the statutes did
prohibit the salesman from accepting his commission directly from the customer. But it did seem to us that such
prohibition did not apply to a case like this, where the customer refused to pay any commission at all and where he
by-passed the salesman and dealt directly with the purchaser and there was no money to go to the broker except
the commission. We therefore commenced the action in
the name of Young alone, on the theory that he was the
real and only party in interest because of the nature of his
contract with Bardsley, the broker.
During the course of the trial, however, this writer became doubtful of the soundness of that position because
the legislature by the amendment of the law in 1951 had
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emphatically declared that salesmen should not have the
right to sue. It did seem that such had been the legislative intent all along, and the amendment had been made to
make definite and certain an intention which before had
been only implicit in the statutes. So we asked and received permission of the Court to implead Bardsley as a
party plaintiff.
It is necessary that he be a party, and, if a recovery is
had, it is necessary that payment be made to him, because
it would render Young liable to punishment as for a misdemeanor if he were to accept payment of the commission
direct from Buchanan. But Bardsley's interest is nil because of his agreement with Young respecting the right to
the commissions.
The contract between Buchanan and Young is not illegal. Buchanan had a right to hire Young to sell the
home. Young had a right to try to sell it and to accept the
employment for he was licensed as a real estate salesman.
What else is the license for but to authorize him to engage
in the business of selling real estate? Buchanan had a right
to promise to pay a commission for the services to be rendered. Young had a right to receive a commission for selling it. The only requirement of the statutes in this regard
is that Young must not accept his commission from the
hands of the customer, but only through the licensed and
bonded real estate broker.
All parties concerned must be presumed to know the
law. Certainly Bardsley and Young knew of this statutory
requirement, for they both had obtained licenses under the
provisions of Chapter 2, Title 82, U. C. A., 1943. So when
the contract was made between Buchanan and Young, the
latter knew he could not lawfully accept the commission
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from the former; and Buchanan presumably knew it would
be a criminal act for Young to accept the commission from
him, but that it would have to be paid through the bonded
broker for whom Young was employed as a salesman.
It was not contrary to law for Buchanan to promise
to pay Young a commission. The statute does not prohibit
such a promise. It was not contrary to law for Young to
accept a commission. It would not be illegal for Buchanan
to pay the commission direct to Young, by which we mean
to say it would be no crime on Buchanan's part for him to
pay direct. The only criminal act involved arises when
Young accepts the commission direct from the hands of
Buchanan, and it is to avoid that result that it must be presumed that the parties to this contract intended the commission to go through the hands of Bardsley to Young. It will
not be presumed that the parties intended any one to become involved in criminal liability. A way was open to
them to avoid such a result. That way was through the
agency of the bonded broker. So it must be presumed that
what they really meant to say, when the contract was written, is that Buchanan would pay Young the commission, but
that he would pay it through the agency of Bardsley, who
was licensed and bonded to accept it from Buchanan and
who was under contract to pay it over to Young.
Buchanan may not have known that Young was working under Bardsley's license and bond, but he is presumed
to know that he was working under some licensed and bonded broker. So far as he was concerned, it matters not
whether it was Bardsley or someone else; he wanted Young
to sell the home and hired him to do so, knowing that he
was protected as to Young's integrity by the bond of some
broker; and knowing, furthermore, that if Young found
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a buyer and a contract were to be closed, the closing agreement would have to be made by a broker and the money,
if not paid direct to the seller, would have to go through
the trust funds of the broker.
The contract does not require Buchanan to do any act
which is prohibited by law; it does not require Young to
do any act which is prohibited by law. It is therefore not
illegal.
The judgment does not require the doing of any act
which is illegal on the part of anyone. The judgment requires that Buchanan pay the commission and the attorney's fee to Bardsley, who by law is entitled to receive it;
and who, by reason of his arrangement with Young, is obligated to turn it over to the latter when received. Young
is not prohibited by law from accepting the commission
from Bardsley; in fact, that is the only place that he may
look for it.
If it had not been for the special contract or arrangement under which Young, the salesman, was operating for
Bardsley, the licensed and bonded broker, this contract between Buchanan and Young would probably be regarded
as a contract between Buchanan and Bardsley; and in that
case Bardsley would be the real and only party in interest,
But because of the understanding between the broker and
the salesman with regard to the expenses of the office and
the commissions to be earned, the contract is in reality as
well as in form between Buchanan and Young, the broker
as a matter of fact appearing in the picture only as the intermediary through whom the commission may lawfully
be paid.
The thought is expressed in appellant's brief that this
judgment is wrong because the contract had expired on
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February 17, 1950, when the property was sold; and that
Bardsley's license had not been renewed for the year 1950,
hence Young's license was not in force.
It is true that the contract had expired when the property was sold. But the liability of Buchanan to pay the
commission on any sale which he made within three months
after the date of expiration had not expired. It continued
for a full period of three months from December 12, 1949.
The cause of action did not arise until February 17, 1950.
It is true that Bardsley did not renew his broker's license
for 1950, but Young did renew his salesman's license for
that year, working for another licensed and bonded broker.
We have no quarrel with the statutory regulations of
real estate brokers and real estate salesmen. Our only concern is to bring our actions in line with them, to learn and
know what they require and to act accordingly. We are
not prepared to believe that the legislature intended, when
it adopted the regulatory statutes with which we are here
concerned, to provide for a system of operations under which
a salesman in Young's situation would be denied all remedy
against the defendant. But such would be the result should
the Court reverse this judgment.
We respectfully submit that there is nothing morally
or legally wrong with any act on the part of Bardsley or
Young in respect to this transaction; that the statutes should
be and can reasonably be construed and applied in such a
manner as to require that this judgment be affirmed.
We therefore respectfully submit that the judgment
should be affirmed and that respondent be awarded his costs.
DILWORTH WOOLLEY,
Attorney for Respondent,
Address: Manti, Utah.
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